Prediction of vaccination coverage level in the heterogeneous mixing population

Heterogeneity of population is a key factor in modeling the transmission of disease among the population and has huge impact on the outcome of the transmission. In order to investigate the decision making process in the heterogeneous mixing population regarding whether to be vaccinated or not, we propose the modeling framework which includes the epidemic models and the game theoretical analysis. We consider two sources of heterogeneity in this paper: the different activity levels and the different relative vaccination costs. It is interesting to observe that, if both sources of heterogeneity are considered, there exist a finite number of Nash equilibria (evolutionary stable strategies (ESS)) of the vaccination game. While if only the difference of activity levels is considered, there are infinitely many Nash equilibira. For the latter case, the initial condition of the decision making process becomes highly sensitive. In the application of public health management, the inclusion of population heterogeneity significantly complicates the prediction of the overall vaccine coverage level.