Coalitions in Repeated Games

Published: June 1, 2019Updated: April 10, 2026PDF arXiv

Abstract

This paper proposes a framework and solution concept for repeated coalitional behavior. We model history-dependent schemes that deter coalitions from blocking using continuation promises and punishments. We evaluate the effectiveness of these schemes across a range of settings, and apply our results to repeated matching and negotiations.

Coalitions in Repeated Games

S. Nageeb Ali, Ce Liu

econ.TH

Published: June 1, 2019Updated: April 10, 2026PDF arXiv

Abstract

This paper proposes a framework and solution concept for repeated coalitional behavior. We model history-dependent schemes that deter coalitions from blocking using continuation promises and punishments. We evaluate the effectiveness of these schemes across a range of settings, and apply our results to repeated matching and negotiations.