Showing 1–18 of 18 results
/ Date/ Name
Apr 23, 2026Post-AGI Economies: Autonomy and the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare EconomicsApr 22, 2026On Rent Dissipation in Dynamic Multi-battle ContestsApr 15, 2026Sandpile Economics: Theory, Identification, and EvidenceApr 15, 2026Balanced Contributions in Networks and Games with ExternalitiesApr 7, 2026The Screening Cost of LiquiditySep 18, 2025Emergent Alignment via CompetitionJul 31, 2025Model-Based Soft Maximization of Suitable Metrics of Long-Term Human PowerNov 13, 2024Orchestrating Organizational Politics: Baron and Ferejohn Meet TullockAug 8, 2024Non-maximizing policies that fulfill multi-criterion aspirations in expectationFeb 11, 2023A Tractable Truthful Profit Maximization Mechanism Design with Autonomous AgentsDec 16, 2022Rationally Inattentive Statistical Discrimination: Arrow Meets PhelpsNov 3, 2021Quantifying Responsibility with Probabilistic Causation -- The Case of Climate ActionApr 21, 2021Rationally Inattentive Echo ChambersSep 3, 2020Electoral Accountability and Selection with Personalized Information AggregationJul 9, 2020Degrees of individual and groupwise backward and forward responsibility in extensive-form games with ambiguity, and their application to social choice problemsOct 26, 2018Intermediated ImplementationOct 26, 2018Optimal Incentive Contract with Endogenous Monitoring TechnologyMar 15, 2018Reputation is required for cooperation to emerge in dynamic networks